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RECASTING DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
IN LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA 
 
Gary Gereffi 
Department of Sociology, Duke University 
 
 
 
This paper is an effort to rethink some of the key suppositions of development theory and to 
identify the fallacies that have been generated by a selective reading of the evidence from East 
Asia and Latin America. Although the East Asian and Latin American nations by no means 
cover the entire spectrum of development possibilities in the Third World, they are a good base 
from which to build solid comparative generalizations because they embody different routes to 
industrial success. This suggests that there are a number of alternative paths of national 
development. 
 
The first part of the paper outlines several theoretical perspectives on development that highlight 
key features of the East Asian and Latin American experiences. While these perspectives offer 
some important insights, each one is flawed by attempts to generalize beyond the cases that gave 
rise to the insight itself. These misperceptions are dealt with in the remainder of the paper, which 
presents cross-regional evidence from East Asia and Latin America leading to a reformulation 
and synthesis of some of these earlier approaches. 
 
 
Theoretical perspectives on East Asian and Latin American development: perceptions 
and misconceptions 
 
The development theories related to East Asia and Latin America are at several different levels 
of generality, including new trends in the global economy, distinct conceptual categories used to 
describe and analyze the highly industrialized nations in the two regions, and the roles of 
domestic institutions and sociocultural factors that shape the process of national development. 
The literature on the new international division of labor traces the recent surge of manufactured 
exports from the Third World to the emergence of a global manufacturing system based on 
labor-intensive export platforms established by transnational corporations in low-wage 
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areas. This new international division of labor was created in order to exploit reserve armies of 
labor on a world scale by using the advanced transport and communication technologies that 
permit the spatial segmentation of the production process (Fröbel et al. 1981). 
 
An extension of this approach, the globalization of production perspective, argues that the shift 
of manufacturing capacity toward decentralized production sites is occurring in both the 
advanced and the developing countries, and it reflects the increasingly centralized control and 
coordination by transnational corporations (TNCs) of these decentralized production units. This 
has fostered both greater international interdependence and enhanced TNC leverage over 
national governments and domestic labor (Gordon 1988). 
 
The most widely used term in referring to the high-growth, diversified economies of East Asia 
and Latin America is newly industrializing countries (or NICs). The expression was coined in 
the mid-1970s by the advanced capitalist nations which were concerned that a number of 
developing countries were significantly expanding their world share in the production and export 
of manufactured goods (see OECD 1979). The NICs included are South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Brazil, Mexico, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Yugoslavia.) The specter of 'other 
Japans' was a worry to the slumping Western industrial economies, giving rise in some circles to 
strident calls for protectionism. 
 
Once the economic trends in the NICs became well established, the World Bank and prominent 
neoclassical economists in a variety of other institutions began to offer unambiguous policy 
prescriptions regarding the development strategies of these Third World nations. They argued 
that the outward-oriented development strategies of the East Asian NICs led to better economic 
performance in terms of exports, economic growth, and employment than the inward-oriented 
development strategies of the Latin American NICs (see Balassa 1981:1-26, Balassa et al. 1986, 
and World Bank 1987: chapter 5). The clear implication was that the East Asian NICs should 
serve as a model to be emulated by the rest of the developing world. 
 
World-systems theory employs the concept of semiperipheral countries to identify an 
intermediate stratum between core and peripheral nations that promotes the stability and 
legitimacy of the three-tiered world-economy. The countries within the semiperipheral zone, 
which includes the East Asian and Latin American NICs, supposedly have the capacity to resist 
peripheralization but not the capability to move into the upper tier (Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 
and Drangel 1986). 
 
Dependency theory uses the term dependent development to indicate that structural dependency 
on foreign capital and external markets in rapidly industrializing Third World nations like the 
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Latin American and East Asian NICs constrains and distorts, but is not incompatible with, 
capitalist economic development (Evans 1979, Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Gold 1981, Lim 
1985). This was a striking departure from earlier 'stagnationist' views that claimed dependency 
could only lead to underdevelopment and revolution (see Gereffi 1983: chapter 1 for an 
overview of this debate). 
 
Some political scientists argue that one of the key institutional features of successful late 
industrializers is the rise of a developmental state oriented to selective, but substantial, 
intervention in their economies in order to promote rapid capital accumulation and industrial 
progress. In Latin America as well as East Asia, the state has tended to be strong, centralized, 
authoritarian (often under military control), and actively involved in economic affairs (O'Donnell 
1973, Collier 1979, Johnson 1987, Wade 1990). This literature raises the question of whether a 
developmental state is a prerequisite for capitalist industrialization on the periphery. 
 
The rapid growth of the East Asian NICs has refocused attention on the role of cultural factors 
in national development. Various writers have argued recently that Confucianism confers certain 
advantages over other traditions in the quest for economic development (see Berger 1986, Berger 
and Hsiao 1988). Because Confucian beliefs place a high value on hard work, loyalty, respect for 
authority, and punctuality, these characteristics are thought to have facilitated the national 
consensus around high-speed economic growth that has characterized Japan and the East Asian 
NICs in recent decades. In Latin America, on the other hand, the Ibero-Catholic heritage has 
been blamed for giving rise to a divergent set of cultural norms that have impeded the economic 
advancement of the region (see Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978, Wiarda 1982). 
 
Each of these theoretical perspectives contains valuable observations about the development of 
the East Asian and Latin American NICs. Recent comparative research, however, suggests that 
some of these prior generalizations may be too sweeping. They often fit one region or time 
period reasonably well, but falter when their scope is expanded. To facilitate efforts at 
reformulating the earlier theoretical approaches, I will highlight the fallacies or misperceptions 
embedded in each of these perspectives. 
 
(1) The early discussions of the new international division of labor place an undue emphasis on 
labor-intensive, assembly-oriented export production in the NICs, which in retrospect 
characterizes only the initial phase of their export efforts. Since the 1970s, both the East Asian 
and the Latin American NICs have moved toward more technology- and skill-intensive exports 
focusing on high-value-added products. Furthermore, these newer export industries are not 
'export enclaves', but instead promote high levels of integration with a well developed local 
industrial base. 
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(2) The globalization of production approach correctly highlights the emergence of a 
decentralized global manufacturing system in which production capacity is dispersed to an 
unprecedented number of developing as well as industrialized countries. However, this does not 
rest solely on a base of increasingly centralized and coordinated control by TNCs. Local private 
firms are the main exporters in many of the Third World nations today, but their ability to 
effectively capture the economic surplus in these export industries tends to be restricted by the 
kinds of subcontracting relationships in which they are enmeshed. 
 
(3) The East Asian and Latin American NICs are not really 'newly' industrializing, nor have they 
developed in response to the same kinds of global dynamics. Because of their origins in the mid-
1970s as a defensive reaction by OECD countries to increasing Third World exports, many 
studies of the NICs tend to focus too narrowly on manufactured exports and they implicitly or 
explicitly marginalize the opportunities for countries that have a rich endowment of natural 
resources. To understand the emergence of the NICs, we need to adopt a broader historical and 
world-systems perspective that is sensitive to different kinds of economic capabilities in Third 
World nations. 
 
(4) The contrast between the outward-oriented and inward-oriented development strategies of the 
East Asian and Latin American NICs, respectively, is overdrawn. Each of the countries in the 
two regions has pursued a combination of inward- and outward-oriented strategies. Furthermore, 
it is this mix of development strategies that helps us to understand how industrial diversification 
has led to enhanced export flexibility and competitiveness in both sets of NICs in the 1980s. 
 
(5) The semiperipheral zone encompasses an extremely diverse range of countries. In order to 
understand the actual roles played by semiperipheral nations in the world-economy today, we 
need to disaggregate this concept and focus on the specific characteristics of the NICs in 
different geographical regions like East Asia and Latin America. 
 
(6) Dependent development is applicable to the NICs in East Asia as well as Latin America. The 
nature and consequences of dependency are quite different in the two regions, however. 
Dependency in the East Asian NICs is a product of their heavy reliance on foreign aid and 
foreign trade, while dependency in the Latin American NICs is an outgrowth of their extensive 
involvement with transnational corporations and transnational banks. The developmental 
consequences of these different types of dependency turn, in large degree, on the ability of the 
state to convert these external linkages to national advantage. Successful 'dependency 
management' depends on the historical timing of these efforts as well as institutional factors. 
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(7) While there is a substantial degree of state intervention in the economies of the Latin 
American and East Asian NICs (with the exception of Hong Kong), the developmental state is 
not a singular phenomenon in the two regions. The objectives, social bases, and policy 
instruments of the state are quite different in each country, with major implications for the 
exercise of state autonomy in areas like industrial policy. 
 
(8) Simplistic cultural arguments run into a variety of problems. First, 
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regions are not culturally homogeneous; this is particularly true of East Asia. More importantly, 
both the Confucian and Ibero-Catholic traditions have existed for centuries. The dynamic shifts 
in terms of high-speed economic growth, however, have occurred primarily in recent decades, 
especially in East Asia. A more sophisticated cultural interpretation would see culture as 
historically situated, emergent, and mediated through institutions (see Swidler 1986). The impact 
of cultural variables probably is most important in outlining an acceptable range of solutions to 
development problems, rather than in determining specific economic outcomes. 
 
The following sections of this paper address some of these themes in greater detail. In closing, I 
will outline the elements for a new theoretical synthesis, with some suggestions for future 
research. 
 
 
Contemporary industrialization in the NICs: similarities and contrasts 
 
The East Asian and Latin American NICs are a very heterogeneous group, with major 
differences in terms of population size, land area, resource endowments, cultural legacies, 
political regimes, social structures, per capita income, and economic policies. Nonetheless, these 
nations tend to have several dynamic features in common that lead them to be widely perceived 
as industrial 'success stories': rapid and relatively sustained economic growth, based on a sharp 
increase in the manufacturing sector's share of total output and employment; a growing 
diversification of industrial production that permits each nation to make ever broader ranges of 
manufactured goods; and a fast expansion of exports with an emphasis on manufactures. 
 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Latin American and East Asian NICs were at similar levels of 
industrial development. They all were classified as upper-middle-income countries by World 
Bank standards, with their gross national product (GNP) per capita varying from a low of $1,700 
in South Korea to a high of $5,240 in Singapore. Their overall degree of industrialization also 
was quite high. Industry's share of gross domestic product (GDP) in the NICs ranged from 34 
percent in Brazil to 44 percent 
Notes: Because manufacturing is generally the most dynamic part of the idustrial sector, its share of GDP is shown separately.
The most recent data are for  1988
The most recent data for GDP and the percentage distribution of GDP are for 1988.
GDP per capita.
1980
NA = Not available.
Sources: World  Bank, 1983, pp. 149, 153; 1991, pp. 205, 209; and CEPD, 1989, pp. 3-4, 23, 29, 41 and 199 for the data on Taiwan
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in Taiwan  (see Table 1),   which put most of the NICs above the  industrial market countries' 
industry/GDP average of 36 percent (World Bank 1983:153). 
 
Manufacturing, the most dynamic part of the industrial sector, has been the cornerstone of 
development for the NICs. In 1989, the prominence of manufacturing activities in all the NICs 
(from 21 percent of GDP in Hong Kong to 39 percent in Taiwan) was much higher than in the 
United States (17 percent) and comparable to many of the other advanced industrial economies, 
including Japan (30 percent). 
 
However, while the East Asian NICs continued to grow rapidly during the 1980s, the Latin 
American NICs suffered an absolute as well as a relative decline. The GNP per capita figures for 
1989 highlight both trends (see Table 1). In the East Asian NICs, GNP per capita in 1989 was 
two to five times higher than in the Latin American nations: Singapore - $10,450, Hong Kong - 
$10,350, Taiwan - $6,160, South Korea - $4,400, Brazil - $2,540, Argentina - $2,160, and 
Mexico - $2,010. Furthermore, Argentina and Mexico had substantially lower per capita incomes 
in 1989 than eight years earlier, while Brazil's income increased by just 14 percent. The East 
Asian NICs, on the other hand, more than doubled their average incomes in the 1980s. 
 
Similar trends are evident if we look at the export performance for the NICs in the two regions. 
In 1981, the Latin American and East Asian NICs each exported between $20 and $23 billion of 
goods, with the exception of Argentina at $6.3 billion. By the end of the decade, however, the 
East Asian NICs clearly established themselves as the Third World's premier exporters, 
especially of manufactures. Taiwan and South Korea topped the list with over $60 billion in 
exports, followed by Singapore ($44.6 billion), Brazil ($34.4 billion), Hong Kong ($28.7 
billion), Mexico ($23 billion), and finally, at a considerable distance from the others, Argentina 
($9.6 billion) (see Table 2). 
 
Manufactured products constitute over 90 percent of total exports in Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Hong Kong, whereas for the Latin American NICs manufactures are only about one-half to one-
third of total exports. Singapore is an intermediate case in that slightly over one-fourth of its 
Notes: Percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding error.
1988.
1979.
NA = Not available.
Sources: World  Bank, 1983, pp. 153, 165,167; 1990, P. 205; and 1991, pp. 209, 230-231, 234-235.
Taiwan's export totals for 1981 are given in  CEDP, 1989, pp. 23, 208.
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exports are primary commodities, mainly petroleum-related products. 
 
The NICs also vary considerably in the priority given to external trade. The East Asian nations 
are export-led economics in which exports in 1989 accounted for 52 percent and 29 percent of 
GDP in Taiwan and South Korea, respectively, and for well over 100 percent of GDP in the 
entrepôt city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore. This compares with export/GDP ratios of 11 
percent in Brazil and Mexico, and 18 percent in Argentina (Table 2). To put these figures in a 
broader perspective, Japan, which often is seen as a model for its East Asian neighbors, had an 
export/GDP ratio of less than 10 percent in 1989, while the export ratio for the United States was 
about 7 percent. The East Asian NICs, partly because of their smaller size, thus are far more 
dependent on external trade than their larger Latin American counterparts or Japan. 
 
The emergence and evolution of the NICs has been a product of cyclical shifts in the world-
economy, in which export promotion followed and built upon earlier and relatively successful 
efforts at import substitution. To gain a better picture of the dynamic relationship between these 
patterns of inward- and outward-oriented industrialization, we need to examine more closely the 
paths of industrialization followed by the Latin American and East Asian NICs. 
 
 
The dynamic interplay of inward- and outward-oriented industrialization 
 
Based on a broad historical view of industrialization in the Latin American and East Asian NICs, 
one can identify five main phases of industrial development. Three of these are outward-looking: 
a commodity export phase, and primary and secondary export-oriented industrialization (EOI). 
The other two are inward-looking: primary import-substituting industrialization (ISI) and 
secondary ISI. The subtypes within the outward and inward approaches are distinguished by the 
kinds of products involved. 
 
In the commodity export phase, the output typically is unrefined or semiprocessed raw materials 
(agricultural goods, minerals, oil, etc.). Primary ISI entails the shift from imports to the local 
manufacture of basic consumer goods, and in almost all countries the key industries during this 
phase are textiles, clothing, footwear, and food-processing. Secondary ISI involves using 
domestic production to substitute for imports of a variety of capital- and technology-intensive 
manufactures: consumer durables (e.g. automobiles), intermediate goods (e.g. petrochemicals 
and steel), and capital goods (e.g. heavy machinery). The two phases of EOI both involve 
manufactured exports. In primary EOI these tend to be labor-intensive products, while secondary 
EOI includes higher value-added items that are skill-intensive and require a more fully 
developed local industrial base. 
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Following this schema, the principal sequences of industrial development in Mexico, Brazil, 
South Korea and Taiwan are outlined in Figure 1. For purposes of convenience, the phrase 'paths 
of industrialization' will be used to refer to these economic outcomes. The varied role of 
government policies, incentives, and explicit development strategies in bringing about these 
industrial shifts is an important but separate issue (this topic is analyzed in Cheng and Haggard 
1987, Cheng 1990, Dore 1990, Kaufman 1990, and Wade 1990). 
 
Each of the two regional pairs of NICs has followed a distinctive industrial trajectory that 
includes the ISI and EOI ideal types mentioned above, plus a 'mixed' phase in the most recent 
period. An analysis of these trajectories, as shown in Figure 1, suggests the following 
conclusions (see Gereffi and Wyman 1989). 
 
First, the contrast often made between the Latin American and East Asian NICs as representing 
inward- and outward-oriented industrial paths, respectively, is oversimplified. While this 
distinction is appropriate for some periods, a historical perspective shows that each of these 
NICs has pursued both inward- and outward-oriented approaches. 
 
Every nation, with the exception of Britain at the time of the Industrial Revolution, went through 
an initial stage of ISI in which protection was extended to incipient manufacturing industries 
producing for domestic markets. Even Hong Kong, the most laissez-faire of the NICs, benefited 
from a period of 'disguised ISI' on the Chinese mainland. Refugees to Hong 
Brazil and Mexico:
1974-1981
Brazil and Mexico:
1982 to present
Brazil and Mexico:
1955-1973
Brazil and Mexico:
1930-1955
Brazil and Mexico:
1880-1930
Taiwan:    1895-1945
Korea:       1910-1945
Taiwan:    1950-1959
S.Korea:   1953-1960
Taiwan:    1960-1972
S.Korea:   1961-1972
Taiwan and S. Korea:
1980 to present
Taiwan and S.Korea:
1973 to 1979
Commodity Exports
Primary EOI
Secondary ISI
Primary ISI
Debt-led Secondary ISI
Secondary ISI
Diversified Export Promotion
and Continued Secondary ISI
Secondary EOI
ISI    =  Import-Substituting Industrialization
EOI  =  Export-Oriented Industrialization
FIGURE  1
DEVELOPMENT  STRATEGIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA: COMMONALITIES, DIVERGENCE, AND CONVERGENCE
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Kong from the mainland included a significant segment of the Shanghai capitalist class and a 
huge supply of politically unorganized labor, and they brought with them technical know-how, 
skills, and even machinery (Haggard and Cheng 1987:106-10). Furthermore, each of the NICs 
subsequently has combined both advanced ISI and different types of EOI in order to avoid the 
inherent limitations of an exclusive reliance on domestic or external markets, and also to 
facilitate the industrial diversification and upgrading that are required for these nations to remain 
competitive in the world economy. Rather than being mutually exclusive alternatives, the ISI and 
EOI development paths in fact have been complementary and interactive (Gereffi and Wyman 
1990). 
 
Second, the early phases of industrialization - commodity exports and primary ISI - were 
common to all of the Latin American and East Asian NICs, although the timing and specific 
products involved varied considerably. The subsequent divergence in the regional sequences 
stems from the ways in which each country responded to the basic problems associated with the 
continuation of primary ISI. These problems included balance of payments pressures, rapidly 
rising inflation, high levels of dependence on intermediate and capital goods imports, and low 
levels of manufactured exports. 
 
Third, the duration and timing of these development patterns vary by region. Primary ISI began 
earlier, lasted longer, and was more populist in Latin America than in East Asia. Timing helps 
explain these sequences because the opportunities and constraints that shape development 
choices are constantly shifting. The East Asian NICs began their accelerated export of 
manufactured products during a period of extraordinary dynamism in the world-economy. The 
two decades that preceded the global economic crisis of the 1970s saw unprecedented annual 
growth rates of world industrial production (approximately 5.6 percent) and world trade (around 
7.3 percent), relatively low inflation and high employment rates in the industrialized countries, 
and stable international monetary arrangements. The expansion of world trade was fastest 
between 1960 and 1973, when the average annual growth rate of exports reached almost 9 
percent. 
 
Starting in 1973, however, the international economy began to enter a troublesome phase. From 
1973 to the end of the decade, the annual growth in world trade fell to 4.5 percent as 
manufactured exports from the developing countries began to encounter stiffer protectionist 
measures in the industrialized markets. These new trends were among the factors that led the 
East Asian NICs to modify their EOI approach in the 1970s (see Cheng and Haggard 1987). 
 
Fourth, the development trajectories of the Latin American and East Asian NICs show some 
signs of convergence in the 1970s and 1980s. To support this convergence thesis, it is necessary 
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to distinguish two subphases during the most recent period. In the 1970s Mexico and Brazil 
began to expand both their commodity exports (oil, soybeans, minerals, etc.) and their 
manufactured exports, as well as to accelerate their foreign borrowing, in order to acquire 
enough foreign exchange to finance the imports necessary for furthering secondary ISI. This 
'diversified exports' approach, which became even more prominent in the 1980s in the face of 
sharpy curtailed foreign borrowing, was an important addition to Mexico's and Brazil's earlier 
emphasis on industrial deepening. 
 
South Korea and Taiwan, on the other hand, emphasized heavy and chemical industrialization 
from 1973 to 1979, with a focus on steel, automobiles, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. The 
objective of heavy and chemical industrialization in East Asia was twofold: to develop national 
production capability in these sectors, justified by national security as well as import-substitution 
considerations, and to lay the groundwork for more diversified exports in the future. China's re-
entry into the international community, ushered in by its détente with the United States in the 
early 1970s, not only made South Korea and Taiwan's domestic defense concerns more credible, 
but China also presented a long-term competitive threat to labor-intensive industries in the 
region. South Korea and Taiwan have used the secondary ISI industries established during the 
1970s as a base for launching a far more variegated array of technology- and skill-intensive 
manufactured exports in the 1980s (Gereffi 1989a). It is clear that neither inward-oriented nor 
outward-oriented paths of industrialization are self-sufficient models of development. Both are 
susceptible to systemic constraints or vulnerabilities such as recurring balance of payments 
problems, persistent inflation, and the disruption of key trading relationships (see Gereffi 
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1990b). However, the NICs in each region have adapted or switched their development 
trajectories in response to these problems, and thus they succeeded in moving to a more 
diversified pattern of export growth in the 1980s. An adequate understanding of how this 
happens requires a model of policy change that is responsive to the typical crises generated by 
the ISI and EOI development paths, as we will see below. 
 
 
A crisis model of policy change in the NICs: the limits of ISI and EOI 
 
This overview of the development sequences of the Latin American and East Asian NICs has 
brought to light several critical turning points in each country's industrialization experience. This 
raises a number of key questions. What causes the broad cross-regional development patterns - 
commonalities, divergence, and convergence - that have been noted? When a specific 
development approach is no longer viable, what factors influence a country's choice of its 
subsequent strategy? In particular, why did Latin American NICs respond to a crisis in primary 
ISI by a continued emphasis on supplying the domestic market through secondary ISI, while the 
East Asian NICs responded to a similar crisis by adopting an export-oriented approach? Why do 
the NICs in both regions appear to be converging toward a 'mixed' model in the 1980's which is 
simultaneously inward- and outward-oriented? 
 
To answer these questions, one needs a comparative perspective on policy change that is both 
historical and structural. As a starting point, it is important to distinguish between development 
'patterns', which are clusters of interrelated economic outcomes, and development 'strategies', 
which are defined as 'sets of policies that shape a country's relationship to the global economy 
and that affect the domestic allocation of resources among industries and social groups' (Gereffi 
and Wyman 1989:28). Development strategies thus define and mediate a country's relationship to 
the international environment, as well as embody domestic priorities regarding economic growth 
and equity. 
 
Government decision-making in capitalist societies is often pragmatic and incremental rather 
than strategic, responding to immediate crises and short-term dilemmas rather than to long-range 
plans and comprehensive schemes for change (see Kaufman 1990, Cheng 1990). With regard to 
the NICs, the discussion of 'import substitution' and 'export promotion' frequently is misleading 
because this distinction is ignored: the domestic policies associated with ISI and EOI can refer to 
short-term defensive tactics as well as long-term development strategies. The fact that many 
economic policies are motivated by crisis situations does not invalidate the notion of 
development strategies, though, since they still retain much of their capacity to influence 
subsequent decisions even if they emerge as post-hoc constructs. 
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The main crisis situations that generate defensive reactions or strategic shifts are of two sorts. 
There are external crises, such is wars, world economic depressions, or severe raw material 
shortages (e.g. the oil crisis of the 1970s). These crises test a country's capacity to adjust to a 
radically changed external environment, but they usually are not predicted or planned for in 
advance. In addition to these catastrophic external events, there are also developmental crises 
that are inherent in particular development strategies, such as ISI or EOI. These developmental 
crises are the result of systemic constraints that lead countries to periodically modify or adapt a 
given economic orientation. 
 
To better understand this process of crisis-induced policy change, one must examine both the 
motives and the limits associated with ISI and EOI. The original justification given to ISI in 
Latin America was not that it was an economic panacea, but rather that it allowed nations in the 
region to take advantage of particular opportunities presented by their abundant natural resource 
base and relatively large domestic markets. Thus, it presented greater possibilities for industrial 
diversification and increases in GDP per capita than the commodity export model did. 
 
Similarly, the East Asian nations had varied motives for undertaking EOI. For Taiwan and South 
Korea, it was primarily a means of acquiring needed foreign exchange when the US government 
announced in the late 1950s it planned to reduce official aid disbursements to these countries; 
Hong Kong, as a commercial entrepôt, had no industrial alternative to EOI because it had a small 
domestic market and no agricultural hinterland; Singapore turned to EOI for reasons similar to 
Hong Kong's when it was dissociated from Malaysia; one of Malaysia's primary goals in 
adopting EOI was employment creation; and Indonesia was strongly inclined to move toward 
EOI when its oil revenues began to fall. The fact that countries adopted EOI for different reasons 
is important in order to know the conditions under which this strategy is viewed as successful by 
the countries pursuing it. The choice of EOI or ISI for whatever purpose, however, implies 
potential constraints. 
 
As a development strategy, ISI confronts four main limitations. The first is that, paradoxically, 
given its advocacy on the grounds of enabling countries to escape from the foreign exchange 
bind associated with late industrialization, it tends to cause even greater foreign exchange 
vulnerability. This is because ISI is import-intensive, and gives rise to the need for more 
intermediate and capital goods imports to the extent that consumer goods production advances. 
Indeed, secondary ISI was relatively successful in Latin America because it was implemented 
during a period of unusually favorable commodity prices induced by the Korean War (Fishlow 
1985:128). A related problem is that standard ISI policies like overvalued exchange rates tend to 
discourage exports. 
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Secondly, import substitution also gives rise to sectoral imbalances. Industrial production tends 
to be emphasized at the expense of agricultural output. Food production in Latin America has not 
been able to keep pace with urban demand, and industry has been unable to generate enough jobs 
to absorb the effects of rapid population growth and migration to the cities. In addition, 
agricultural exports have a tendency to fall, thus further reducing the availability of foreign 
exchange. 
 
Third, ISI tends to generate fiscal disequilibria as the state increasingly has been called upon to 
subsidize the continuing investments in industry from its own revenues. This leads to a vicious 
circle: increased government expenditures fuel accelerating inflation, which aggravates the 
balance of payments problem by further overvaluing the exchange rate, thus curbing the appetite 
of private sector entrepreneurs for productive investment in export industries. 
 
Finally, there were real limits to ISI's potential as a source of continuous economic growth, given 
the severe income inequalities that characterized Mexico, Brazil, and most of the other Latin 
American nations. In addition, the capital-intensive technology used in advanced ISI industries 
diminished its job creation impact (Sunkel and Paz 1970:361-3). The export sector thus not only 
stimulated the ISI process, but also constituted a real limit on it. The success of ISI in the 
finished consumer goods sector did not truly substitute for imports in an absolute sense, but 
rather displaced imports toward the intermediate and capital goods industries that would become 
the ultimate target of ISI efforts. 
 
Although EOI has been viewed by some as the new 'development orthodoxy' for Third World 
nations based on the extraordinary dynamism achieved by the 'Four Tigers' (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) in East Asia, it should be emphasized that EOI is not a 
universal route to success either. Three conditions must be present for EOI to produce good 
results: (1) the maintenance of favorable prices for exports and stability in the prices of imports; 
(2) continued economic growth in key overseas markets, typically the United States, Western 
Europe, and Japan; and (3) a nonprotectionist world trading atmosphere. By the 1980s, the 
existence of each of these conditions was being called into question. 
 
There are also other vulnerabilities inherent in EOI. The first is what can be called a 'fallacy of 
composition' - if all developing countries tried to pursue export-led growth at the same time, the 
ensuing competition would drive down the gain for all (Fishlow 1985:138). A high degree of 
openness has two related disadvantages: it makes an economy more susceptible to external 
shocks, and the marginal gains from trade tend to diminish as economies become progressively 
more open. It is also important to note that EOI, like ISI, is import-intensive. It requires a high 
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volume and diverse range of imports to satisfy the input needs of a rapidly expanding export 
economy, especially one that is small or lacking in natural resources. Finally, EOI employment 
is often more unstable than traditional manufacturing employment, particularly if foreign-
dominated export-processing zones are a main component of a country's export structure. 
 
An analysis of the constraints inherent in ISI and EOI is crucial in order to clarify the nature of 
the development choices facing the NICs. Both ISI and 
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EOI are susceptible to recurring balance of payments problems, which are a byproduct of 
negative trade balances, heavy foreign indebtedness, the flight of substantial amounts of private 
capital, etc. When confronting a balance of payments problem, a nation has a variety of possible 
options. The most obvious are to increase exports via primary commodities or manufactured 
items; decrease imports, which could involve import-substituting local production (by foreign or 
local companies), the restriction of imports (e.g., to essential items), or simply doing without 
most imported goods which runs the risk of a severe recession; and finance imports either 
through economic aid, borrowing from abroad, or domestic savings. Which of these options were 
pursued, and in what order, became prime determinants of the different industrial paths the Latin 
American and East Asian NICs took after primary ISI (see Gereffi 1990b:246-56). 
 
 
State structures and social coalitions 
 
Development strategies are state-centered policies - i.e., they are policies designed and executed 
primarily by governments. Different groups in society may have strong policy preferences on 
certain issues, but the formulation of a development strategy implies at least some degree of state 
leadership. Since the state is the agent that adopts a development strategy, an interest in the 
sequence and choice of these strategies requires us to examine the ways in which political 
structures buffer the state from the pressures of civil society, as well as the content of the policy 
preferences of governmental elites. 
 
A standard reference point for Latin American studies on the nature of the state and its role in 
development was Guillermo O'Donnell's analysis of the emergence and dynamics of 
'bureaucratic-authoritarian' (BA) regimes in the southern cone of Latin America (O'Donnell 
1973, Collier 1979). More recently, Bruce Cumings introduced the term 'bureaucratic-
authoritarian industrializing regimes' (BAIRs) to refer to the strong states in South Korea and 
Taiwan (Cumings 1984). While these models of political regimes grew out of specific regional 
and historical contexts, it would be useful for researchers of both Latin America and East Asia to 
push toward some integrating or overarching conceptualization of the state in the context of late, 
dependent, capitalist development. 
The similarities among the states in the NICs of the two regions are quite apparent: they tend to 
be strong, centralized, authoritarian (often under military control), and actively and extensively 
involved in economic affairs. The differences are equally notable. The origins of the BA regimes 
and the BAIRs contrast sharply. Exclusionary BA regimes in Latin America (this includes 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile, but not Mexico) emerged from the crises produced by 
periods of populist rule, when organized labor had been one of the important bases of social 
support of the state. BAIRs, on the other hand, inherited the centralized state apparatus from the 
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Japanese colonial period and enjoyed a significant measure of autonomy from local social groups 
and classes, including those most likely to be affected by rapid industrialization, such as large 
landowners and workers. Whereas BA regimes had to repress previously mobilized popular 
sector organizations, such as free trade unions, the BAIRs did not confront an activated popular 
sector and were exclusionary from the outset. 
 
A second contrast has to do with the social alliances on which the two kinds of regimes are 
based. In most Latin American BA regimes, international capital is an important part of the 
dominant coalition that also includes the military, select industrial groups, and civilian 
technocrats. In the East Asian BAIRs, international capital is a relatively minor actor, while the 
role of domestic economic groups integrated across industrial, trade, and financial sectors is 
central. Although labor is excluded in both BA regimes and BAIRs, labor until recently has been 
a more influential actor in Latin America than in East Asia (see Deyo 1987). 
 
If we are to fruitfully compare and contrast the nature and role of interventionist states in a cross-
regional setting, however, we need to go beyond simplistic notions like 'strong' versus 'weak' 
states. State-led industrialization in the NICs, prior to the much heralded wave of 
redemocratization experiences in Latin America in the late 1980s (O'Donnell et al. 1986), has 
been characterized by authoritarianism. Yet authoritarianism per se does not guarantee either 
state strength or state autonomy. The majority of developing countries still have authoritarian 
regimes, but few have autonomous or strong states. Political leadership, economic ideology, the 
role of the technobureaucracy, and the organizational resources and discretion of decentralized 
public agencies all need to be taken into consideration to show how state intervention has come 
about and been made effective in specific historical contexts. 
 
The development trajectories of the Latin American and East Asian NICs are rooted in social 
coalitions - i.e., constellations of interests that support or oppose particular development 
strategies. Traditional agrarian and mining export elites, for example, promoted the primary 
product export model. Industrial workers, national producers of finished goods, and middle- and 
low-income consumers, on the other hand, generally were united in their support of primary ISI, 
even as the agro-export elite opposed this approach that jeopardized their privileged position. 
 
As the initial industrialization phase came to an end, however, the political parameters for 
continuing industrial expansion began to narrow (Kaufman 1990). In countries like Argentina, 
Brazil, and Mexico, which promoted investment in consumer durable as well as intermediate 
goods sectors (secondary ISI), the social basis of this strategy was the 'triple alliance' of TNCs, 
affiliated local manufacturers, and the state, along with skilled workers and upper-middle class 
consumers who could afford to buy items like automobiles and major electrical appliances 
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(Evans 1979). Agro-export elites, non-import-substituting firms, and the poor had little to gain 
from this strategy, although the political climate was such that they did not effectively challenge 
it. The popular sector's main impact on development strategies in the Latin American and East 
Asian NICs generally affects the implementation of development policies, rather than the goal 
formulation and agenda setting stage of national affairs (Deyo 1990). 
 
In the turn to EOI, big business (foreign and domestic) has played very different roles in the 
Latin American and East Asian NICs (Gereffi 1990a). Although the TNCs that came into Brazil 
and Mexico to help implement secondary ISI in the 1950s and 1960s initially were satisfied to 
supply protected domestic markets, both countries have had some success since the 1970s 
requiring foreign manufacturers to generate increasing export revenues as a condition for 
continued access to their domestic economies (Gereffi and Evans 1981). However, the key 
position of TNCs in the Latin American NICs' export industries poses serious potential 
constraints to the formulation of national industrial policies, since foreign firms operate with a 
global rather than a domestic frame of reference. Political or economic instability within the 
NICs, or temporary downturns in major export markets, frequently are sufficient to bring 
expanding exports to a halt. In addition, TNCs often form class alliances with local managerial 
and technical cadres, affiliated suppliers, the workers who rely on TNCs for their jobs, and the 
middle class that consumes their products. These alliances serve to buffer the foreign firms from 
excessive governmental pressure (Gereffi and Newfarmer 1985:432). 
 
The relative importance of TNCs has been far less in South Korea and Taiwan, where locally 
owned firms account for the lion's share (around 85 percent) of exports. While the state actively 
participates in the economies of the East Asian NICs, a good deal of this involvement is indirect 
(e.g. government-controlled credit, regulating the purchase of raw materials, energy, and foreign 
exchange, and price controls) (Wade 1990). Nonetheless, business groups in East Asia are 
crucially important in the implementation of the government's economic policies. Although 
South Korea's large, vertically integrated industrial conglomerates (chaebols) and Taiwan's 
business groups made up of loosely knit agglomerations of small and medium-size family firms 
(jituanqive) highlight the differences between their countries' centralized versus decentralized 
patterns of industrialization, respectively, both play a similar organizational role to TNCs in the 
Latin American countries by utilizing their export networks to link their respective economics to 
dynamic overseas markets. East Asia's private exporters are encouraged by their governments to 
adopt a mercantilistic approach to global markets, since overseas sales are equated at home with 
enhanced national security, profitability, and prestige. 
 
The social bases of support for development strategies are not likely to be the same across 
regions, nor are the forces that contribute to the downfall of one strategy necessarily those that 
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initiate or help institutionalize a subsequent strategy. The analysis of social coalitions, therefore, 
must be flexible enough to account for both periods of stability as well as turning points in the 
development process. 
 
 
26 DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 
Dependent development in Latin America and East Asia 
 
The generalizability of dependency theory has been challenged because of its historically close 
association with the development of the Latin American NICs. The 'dependent development' 
literature drew heavily on the experience of Latin American nations, and it looked at the 
problems of Third World development with an eye toward investment and debt dependency. 
Therefore it has been claimed that dependency theory has little, if any, relevance to the East 
Asian NICs (Amsden 1979, Barrett and Whyte 1982, Berger 1986). In fact, the East Asian NICs 
have experienced two quite distinct kinds of dependency: the dependency on American aid in the 
1950s, and trade dependency, again largely on the United States, since the 1960s. The internal 
and external consequences of each kind of dependency are quite different, however. 
 
To approach the issue of dependent development in a cross-regional setting, the concept of 
transnational economic linkages (TNELs) is quite useful. There are four main TNELs: foreign 
aid, foreign trade, foreign direct investment, and foreign loans. Table 3 identifies the relative 
importance of each of the TNELs in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan during the 
different phases of industrialization discussed earlier. The 'high', 'medium', and 'low' weights in 
Table 3 are based on estimates of the relative significance of the TNELs in each economy, 
compared with other developing countries at similar stages in their industrialization process. 
 
There is considerable variation among the NICs in the role played by TNELs. First, the salience 
of TNELs varies markedly over time within each region, since each phase of the industrial 
trajectories of the Latin American and East Asian NICs is associated with a different mix of 
external resources used to finance development. In East Asia, for example, primary ISI relied on 
a great deal of foreign aid and little export trade; conversely, the subsequent phase of primary 
EOI was defined by extensive exports and virtually no foreign aid. 
 
Second, the salience of TNELs also varies between the two regions within the same phase of 
industrialization. For example, both regions went through a period of primary ISI, but the 
dynamics were quite different. In 
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East Asia primary ISI was financed by massive amounts of foreign economic assistance, whereas 
in Latin America the same phase tended to be carried out by local industrialists with the support 
of the state and with limited participation by TNCs (Gereffi 1989b:520). 
 
Third, the contrast with regard to TNELs is sharpest during the 1960s, when Latin America's 
secondary ISI is juxtaposed with East Asia's primary EOI. The former phase relied heavily on 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and external loans, but was oriented toward supplying local 
markets; the latter phase depended on access to overseas markets, but was implemented in large 
part by domestic entrepreneurs who drew mainly on local financial resources. This was 
especially true in Taiwan, whereas in South Korea local capitalists became heavily indebted to 
foreign creditors in the 1970s. 
 
Fourth and finally, Latin America and East Asia differ in terms of the overall weight that specific 
TNELs have had in the two regions. Historically FDI and foreign loans represented the most 
important external economic resources for the Latin American NICs; in contrast, export trade 
and foreign aid have been the key forms of East Asian linkage to the international economy. A 
main reason why dependency has been such a thorny issue for the Latin American countries is 
that FDI tends to create greater frictions than other types of foreign capital in Third World 
countries (see Stallings 1990). In the East Asian NICs, on the other hand, trade dependency on 
the United States has been declining since the early 1970s and their export profile has become 
more diversified (Barrett and Chin 1987), thus reducing but not eliminating some of the 
deleterious consequences of export partner and product concentration. 
 
The dependency perspective can be enriched by dealing more explicitly with issues of 
dependency management. This approach focuses attention on the capacity of domestic actors to 
use external economic resources productively and selectively to serve local interests. A key to 
understanding the success of the East Asian NICs' export strategy, for example, is the 
performance of locally owned exporting firms that aggressively sought and exploited 
opportunities for profitable overseas sales. These local exporters established close ties with 
foreign buyers, who assisted in matters of product design and technology transfer. The 
adaptation of available modern technology has enabled the East Asian NICs to move from 
conventional labor-intensive exports like textiles, clothing, and footwear to heavier and high-
tech industries like transportation equipment, electrical machinery, and computer components. 
Joint-venture research projects, as well as locally owned companies, have been set up in South 
Korea and Taiwan to give these countries greater flexibility in developing their own production 
and technological capabilities (Schive 1990). The success of both primary and secondary EOI in 
the East Asian NICs thus is explained in large part by the ability of domestic firms to effectively 
manage their dependency relationships in the areas of international trade and investment. 
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The capacity to manage or renegotiate dependency varies considerably, however, over time and 
in terms of the different TNELs. The Latin American NICs had developed a very nationalistic 
stance toward TNCs by the early 1970s, as evidenced by the wide range of ownership controls 
and performance requirements that were in place in a number of key sectors (e.g. the 
nationalization of natural resource industries, mandatory joint ventures in manufacturing, 
domestic content rules, and export requirements as a condition for new investments in autos and 
computers). However, the severe slump that affected the region in the 1980s led many of these 
measures to be repealed or weakened in order to encourage fresh inflows of investment capital. 
On the other hand, the debt crisis in Latin America proved to be somewhat more manageable by 
the late 1980s than initially believed, as international banks were  pressured by developed 
country governments, among others, to implement measures like debt forgiveness and debt-for-
equity swaps in order to help the Latin American economies recover from the 'lost development 
decade' of the 1980s. 
 
In East Asia, it has become increasingly difficult to cope with the problems of export-led growth. 
Protectionist policies in the industrialized nations of North America and Europe, and intense 
competitive pressures from lower-wage Asian nations like China, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines, have made it more difficult for local firms in South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong to maintain their traditional subcontracting arrangements with foreign buyers. The 
East Asian NICs thus are vulnerable to dislocations in their export activities as foreign buyers 
shift their 
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orders to nations with cheaper labor or more favorable trade relations with the major 
industrialized countries. This has pushed the East Asian NICs to continually upgrade their export 
industries, using advanced technologies and more expensive material inputs, and also to 
undertake rapidly growing levels of FDI in neighboring Asian nations in order to maintain their 
international competitiveness. Thus, dependency management is an ongoing process that leads 
countries to constantly redefine their modes of integration to the world-economy. 
 
 
Culture 
 
The rapid growth of the East Asian NICs has refocused attention on the role of culture in 
national development. Drawing on the seminal work of Max Weber, many social scientists 
center their discussions of culture and development on religious values. A number of writers 
argue that Confucianism confers certain advantages over other traditions in the quest for 
economic development. Confucian values stress the importance of sobriety, education, 
achievement, and reciprocal social obligations, while the Confucian emphasis on hierarchy, 
encourages harmony, cooperation, and loyalty within organizations (Kahn 1979:122). 
 
These characteristics are said to have facilitated the national consensus around high-speed 
economic growth that was evident in Japan and the East Asian NICs in the 1950s and 1960s. 
This culturally derived capacity for cooperation led political elites, industrial leaders, workers, 
and other citizens to agree on the primacy of economic objectives for the society as a whole and 
on the means to achieve those objectives (see Johnson 1983:6-10; and the chapters by Lucian 
Pye, Gordon Redding, and Siu-lun Wong in Berger and Hsiao 1988). 
 
In Latin America, a divergent set of cultural norms based upon an 'Ibero-Catholic' or Hispanic 
heritage has been identified as impeding the economic advancement of the region. According to 
the modernization theorists of the 1960s, this Latin American tradition is characterized by an 
elite culture of luxury, disdain for labor and commerce, a general affinity for ascriptive criteria in 
the distribution of social benefits, and other values typically found in feudal societies (see 
Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978 for a review of this perspective). Lawrence Harrison, the author 
of a book entitled Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind, has voiced one of the most virulent 
indictments against the Hispanic tradition: 'In the case of Latin America, we see a cultural 
pattern, derivative of traditional Hispanic culture, that is anti-democratic, anti-social, anti-
progress, anti-entrepreneurial, and at least among the elite, anti-work' (cited in Fishlow 
1989:118). 
 
Sweeping arguments about the impact of culture on development in East Asia and Latin America 
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run into various problems. First, as some proponents of culturalist arguments acknowledge (e.g. 
Berger 1986), regions are not culturally homogeneous; this is particularly true of East Asia. In 
Taiwan and South Korea, for example, Taoism and Buddhism have important followings along 
with Confucianism. There also is a significant Christian entrepreneurial minority in some 
countries of the region, like South Korea (see Jones and Sakong 1980). Even where 
Confucianism is predominant, there tends to be a gap between the ideal and the reality - i.e., 
between what is believed and what is practiced (Pye 1985). 
 
Further, the same Confucian beliefs that now are thought to facilitate rapid industrialization in 
East Asia were criticized by several generations of Western scholars for inhibiting economic 
development (see Hamilton and Kao 1987). In addition, many of the stereotyped views of 
'Confucian' values may be empirically inaccurate. For instance, East Asian industrial relations 
have not always been (and are not now) harmonious (Gordon 1985, Form and Bae 1988), and 
Chinese employees do not identify closely with their work organizations (Silin 1976). 
 
Instead of a template or predetermined program that mechanically shapes individual behavior, 
culture can be viewed as 'historically situated and emergent, shifting and incomplete meanings 
and practices generated in the webs of agency and power' (Ong 1987:2). This situational 
characterization of culture recognizes that culture is mediated through institutions. Thus, while 
culture highlights core societal values, there is no direct relationship between values and 
behavior independent of an institutional or organizational context. 
 
In addition to the hotly debated issue of a 'Confucian ethic', several other cultural themes are 
associated with cross-regional variations in paths of development. First, observers call attention 
to striking cross-regional differences in attitudes toward the state apparatus and its personnel 
(Dore 1990). The early development of meritocratic educational systems in East Asia, in contrast 
to the more status-oriented systems of Latin America, partly accounts for the greater prestige and 
popular legitimacy of bureaucrats in East Asia, particularly relative to electoral politicians. 
 
Second, there also is evidence of a cultural demonstration effect in international production, 
consumption, and development policy. In some instances, the substance and language of East 
Asian industrial policies seems to have been taken almost directly from Japanese documents 
(Dore 1990). Further, the reemergence of Japan as a regional power after World War II may 
have encouraged the East Asian NICs to imitate Japan's relatively austere personal consumption 
patterns, while the 'showcase modernity' of the Latin American NICs is more in accord with the 
kind of consumer-oriented lifestyle characteristic of the United States (Fajnzylber 1990). 
 
Third, the relative ethnic homogeneity of East Asian societies like South Korea and Japan plays 
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a major role, along with the situational imperatives of resource scarcity, small size, and military 
threats, in heightening nationalistic sentiments which are conducive to a single-minded emphasis 
on economic growth. In this regard the East Asian NICs contrast strikingly with their Latin 
American counterparts, which tend to be far more culturally diverse (Dore 1990). 
 
While culture underlies cross-regional contrasts in several important ways, culture also may help 
to account for intraregional differences in paths of industrial development. For instance, the 
degree of ethnic homogeneity of the East Asian NICs varies within the region, and these 
variations have important social and political consequences. In contrast to the high level of 
ethnic homogeneity in South Korea, political and economic power in Taiwan are distributed 
along an ethnic fault line: The mainlander political elites of the Kuomintang (KMT) remain 
suspicious of any efforts by native business leaders to develop non-party bases of power (Cheng 
1990). Accordingly, the KMT has encouraged the proliferation of small and medium-sized firms 
rather than Korean-style 
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conglomerates. 
 
However, these ethnopolitical cleavages are not the only cultural factors contributing to 
intraregional divergences in industrial structure. Hamilton et al. (1987) underscore the 
importance of family structure and ideology on the size and behavior of industrial concerns in 
South Korea and Taiwan. Interfirm relations in Korean conglomerates, for example, are 
organized on the principle of corporate patriarchy; these enterprises are controlled by a single 
authoritarian individual and operated via hirelings. This principle of economic organization 
facilitates close working relationships between the state and the private sector. In contrast to the 
formal system of command which prevails in Korea, Taiwanese firms are characterized by a 
more decentralized form of management based on patrilineal ties, or personal (primarily 
extended kin) relationships based on reciprocal trust and loyalty. These cultural differences in 
family structures, managerial ideology, and industrial organization provide both opportunities 
and constraints for political elites seeking to guide the industrialization process. 
 
As these examples indicate, to evaluate cultural arguments seriously one needs to turn to history 
and also to look at the evolution of special institutional arrangements. One of the 'lessons' of East 
Asian development may be that the institutional bases underlying the region's growth are 
effective precisely because they have responded flexibly to the traditional forces in each society. 
 
 
The emergent global manufacturing system: toward a theoretical synthesis 
 
This comparative overview of industrialization in the East Asian and Latin American NICs 
provides the elements for a new synthesis in development theory. Two related themes will be 
highlighted to illustrate the direction this approach might take: (1) the declining significance of 
industrialization in the contemporary world-economy; and (2) the emergence of new export roles 
for the NICs. The concluding remarks will address issues for future research. 
 
The Declining Significance of Industrialization 
 
Since the 1950s, the gap between developed and developing countries has been narrowing in 
terms of industrialization. Industry as a share of GDP has increased substantially in the vast 
majority of Third World nations, not only in absolute terms but also relative to that of the core 
countries (see Harris 1987). By the late 1970s, the NICs as a whole not only caught up with but 
overtook the core countries in terms of their degree of industrialization (Arrighi and Drangel 
1986:54-5). 
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While industry and manufacturing as a share of GDP are on the decline in the most developed 
nations of the world-economy, this trend is counterbalanced by the core's emphasis on the 
service sector and on the most productive, high-value-added segments of manufacturing. 
Ironically, as more and more countries in the world are becoming industrialized, industrialization 
itself is losing the key status it once had as an ultimate hallmark of national development. 
 
These observations lead to two basic conclusions about the theoretical status of industrialization 
in the contemporary world-economy. First, 'industrialization' and 'development' are not 
synonymous. This is apparent in the disparate social and economic consequences of industrial 
growth in the Latin American and East Asian NICs over the past couple of decades. Despite 
similarly high levels of industrialization in the NICs from both regions, the East Asian nations 
have performed significantly better than their Latin American counterparts in terms of standard 
indicators of development such as GNP per capita, income distribution, literacy, health, and 
education (see World Bank 1991: Tables 1, 2 and 3). 
 
Second, just as industrialization can not be equated with development, neither does it guarantee 
proximity to core status in the world-system. Although the NICs are now more industrialized 
than most of the core countries, this achievement generally has not led to a substantial change in 
the relative position of the NICs in the hierarchy of nations in the world-economy. Arrighi and 
Drangel (1986:44), who measured upward and downward mobility in the world-system over the 
past 50 years in terms of national changes in per capita GNP, found that 95 percent of the states 
that were classified in one of the three world-system zones (core, semiperiphery, and periphery) 
in 1938-50 were in the same zone in 1975-83. Among the few exceptional cases of upward 
mobility in the world-system were Japan and Italy, which moved from the semiperiphery to the 
core, and South Korea and Taiwan, which moved from the periphery to the semiperiphery. 
 
Therefore, while industrialization may be a necessary condition for core status in the world-
system, it no longer is sufficient. Mobility from the semiperiphery to the core, or the periphery to 
the semiperiphery, should not be defined simply in terms of a country's degree of 
industrialization, but rather by a nation's success in upgrading its mix of economic activities 
toward technology- and skill-intensive products and techniques with higher levels of local value-
added. Innovations by the most developed countries continue to make core status an ever 
receding frontier. 
 
Differentiating the roles of the NICs in the world-economy 
 
The prior analysis of the Latin American and East Asian NICs allows us to identify a 
differentiated set of export roles that semiperipheral nations play in the world-economy. These 
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roles reflect the mix of core-peripheral economic activities in the NICs, as well as the 
significance of core and peripheral capital in carrying out these development efforts. These roles 
are not mutually exclusive, and their importance for a given country or set of countries may 
undergo fairly dramatic shifts over time. 
 
The NICs can be characterized in terms of five basic types of economic roles: (1) the 
commodity-export role; (2) the export-processing role; (3) the component-supplier role; (4) the 
commercial-subcontracting role; and (5) the independent-exporter role. This framework focuses 
on export production in the NICs, since this is the best indicator of a country's international 
competitiveness. 
 
The commodity-export role is of prime importance for the Latin American NICs, where natural 
resources account for one-half to two-thirds of total exports, and also for Singapore, which 
processes and re-exports a large volume of petroleum-related products (see Table 2). Peripheral 
capital controls most of these natural-resource industries at the production stage in Latin 
America, with the petroleum and mining industries usually being run by state-owned enterprises, 
while the agricultural and livestock industries generally are owned by local capital. In Singapore, 
by contrast, TNCs are the proprietors of most of the petroleum-related industries. These 
commodity exports are sent to a wide range of nations, with the predominant share going to core 
countries. The export and distribution networks are usually controlled by core capital. 
 
The export-processing role corresponds to those nations that have foreign-owned, labor-
intensive assembly of manufactured goods in export-processing zones. These zones offer special 
incentives to foreign capital and tend to attract firms in a common set of industries: garments, 
footwear, and basic electronics. Virtually all of the East Asian and Latin American NICs have 
engaged in this form of labor-intensive production, although its significance wanes as wage rates 
rise and countries become more developed. 
 
In Taiwan and South Korea, export-processing zones have been on the decline during the past 10 
to 15 years, largely because labor costs have been rapidly rising. These nations have upgraded 
their mix of export activities by moving toward more skill-and technology-intensive products. 
The export-processing role in Asia is now being occupied by, low-wage countries like China, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. 
 
In Latin America, on the other hand, export-processing industries are on the upswing because the 
wage levels in most countries of the region are considerably below those of the East Asian NICs, 
and recent currency devaluations in the Latin American NICs make the price of their exports 
more competitive internationally. The export platforms in Latin America also have the advantage 
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of geographical proximity to the most important industrial markets (North America and Europe), 
compared with the more distant Asian export-processing zones. Mexico's maquiladora industry 
is probably the largest and most dynamic of these export areas (see Gereffi 1991). There are 
similar zones in Brazil, Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean. Core country firms 
control the production, export, and marketing stages of the production networks for these 
consumer goods. The main contribution of peripheral nations is cheap labor. 
 
The component-supplier role refers to the production of component parts in capital-and 
technology-intensive industries in the NICs for export and usually final assembly in the 
developed countries. Component supply has been a key niche for the Latin American NICs' 
manufactured exports during the past two decades. Brazil and Mexico have been important 
production sites for vertically integrated exports by TNCs to developed country markets, 
especially the United States, since the late 1960s. This is most notable in certain industries like 
motor vehicles, computers, and pharmaceuticals (see Newfarmer 1985). American, European, 
and Japanese automotive TNCs, for example, have advanced manufacturing facilities in Mexico 
and Brazil for the production of engines, auto parts, and even completed vehicles for the US and 
European markets (Gereffi 1990a, Shaiken 1987). 
 
In Latin America, the manufacturing stage of component-supplier production typically is owned 
and run by foreign capital, sometimes in conjunction with a local partner. The export, 
distribution, and marketing of the manufactured items are handled by the TNC. This production 
arrangement is the one most likely to result in a significant transfer of technology from the 
developed countries to their supplier nations. 
 
In East Asia there are two variants of the component-supplier role. The first is similar to the 
Latin American arrangement in which foreign subsidiaries manufacture parts or subunits in East 
Asia for products like television sets, radios, sporting goods, and consumer appliances that are 
assembled and marketed in the country of destination (most often, the United States). The firms 
that engage in this form of specialization subcontracting can be considered as 'captive' 
companies that supply the bulk of their production (usually in excess of 75 percent) to their 
parent corporation. 
 
The second variant of the component-supplier role in East Asia involves production of 
components by local firms for sale to diversified buyers on the world market. These 'merchant' 
producers sell virtually all of their output on the open market. The importance of 'merchant' 
producers is illustrated in the semiconductor industry. South Korean companies have focused 
almost exclusively on the mass production of powerful memory chips, the single largest segment 
of the semiconductor industry, which are sold as inputs to a wide range of domestic and 
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international manufacturers of electronic equipment. Taiwan, on the other hand, has targeted the 
highest-value-added segment of the semiconductor market: tailor-made 'designer chips' that 
perform special tasks in toys, video games, and other machines. Taiwan now has 40 chip-design 
houses that specialize in finding export niches and then develop products for them (Far Eastern 
Economic Review 1988). 
 
The commercial-subcontracting role refers to the production of finished consumer goods by 
locally owned firms, where the output is distributed and marketed by large retail chains and their 
agents (Holmes 1986:85). This is one of the major niches filled by the East Asian NICs in the 
contemporary world-economy. In 1980, three of the East Asian NICs (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
South Korea) accounted for 72 percent of all finished consumer goods exported by the Third 
World to OECD countries, other Asian countries supplied another 19 percent, while just 7 
percent came from Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States was the leading market 
for these products with 46 percent of the total (Keesing 1983:338-9). In East Asia, domestic 
firms control the production stage of the finished-consumer-goods commodity chains, while 
foreign capital tends to control the more profitable export, distribution, and retail marketing 
stages. While the international subcontracting of finished consumer goods is growing in Latin 
America, it tends to be subordinated to the export-platform and component-supplier forms of 
production. 
 
The latter two types of international subcontracting, component-supply and commercial 
subcontracting, could be stepping stones to more autonomous levels of industrial development if 
the manufacturing countries introduce new products and gain some degree of control over the 
marketing of the goods they make. Taiwan, with its technological prowess, is acquiring the 
flexibility to move into the high-value-added field of product innovation. However, without their 
own internationally recognized company brand names, a substantial advertising budget, and 
appropriate marketing and retail networks, Taiwan's ingenious producers will find it difficult to 
break free of the commercial subcontracting role. South Korea probably has more potential to 
enter developed country markets successfully because its chaebols have the capital and 
technology to set up overseas production facilities and marketing networks. Thus South Korea's 
leading auto manufacturer, Hyundai Motor Company, has become one of the top importers into 
both Canada and the United States since the mid-1980s (see Gereffi 1990a). 
 
The final role in this typology is the independent-exporter role. This refers to those export 
industries in which there is no subcontracting relationship between the manufacturer and the 
distributor or retailer of the product. These goods can range from construction materials (like 
cement, lumber, and standard chemicals) to a wide variety of food, clothing, and electronics 
items (such as beer, watches, jewelry, radios, etc.). Independent party transactions are most 
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common for resource-based or mature products in which the logic of the comparative advantage 
paradigm still works to a degree. Transport and energy costs, exchange rates, wages, interest 
rates, and low-priced resource-based inputs all play a determining role in the growth of these 
exports. 
 
This typology of the different roles that the Latin American and East Asian NICs play in the 
world-economy shows that the standard development literature has presented an oversimplified 
picture of the semiperiphery. The East Asian NICs have been most successful in the areas of 
commercial subcontracting and component supply, with secondary and declining importance 
given to the export-platform role emphasized in the 'new international division of labor' literature 
(Fröbel et al. 1981). The Latin American NICs, on the other hand, have a different kind of 
relationship to the world-economy. They are prominent in the commodity-export, export-
platform, and component-supplier forms of production, but they lag far behind the East Asian 
NICs in the commercial-subcontracting type of manufactured exports. 
 
Although each of these roles has certain advantages and disadvantages in terms of mobility in 
the world-system, the prospects for the NICs can only be understood by looking at the 
interacting sets of roles in which these nations are enmeshed. The Latin American nations 
economically tend to be far more diverse than the East Asian NICs. Many of the former possess 
a wide range of natural resources, abundant labor, and relatively large domestic markets. This 
allows Latin American nations to pursue a variety of export roles simultaneously, including raw 
material exports. The objective should be to create competitive advantage by maximizing the 
economic and technological benefits that can be attained from this 
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industrial diversity, rather than to rely exclusively on the region's current comparative advantage 
in cheap labor and proximity to the US market. 
 
 
Directions for future research 
 
The theoretical synthesis outlined above suggests several promising areas for research on the 
varied performance of the NICs in the world-economy. In order to better understand why some 
nations have developed more rapidly or extensively than others, and what the latter can learn 
from the former, we should focus on several interrelated levels of analysis: the global or world-
system level, policies and institutions at the national level, and the social bases of 
competitiveness at the local level. 
 
The global manufacturing system that has emerged in the last couple of decades and the related 
expansion in export activity by the NICs has led to new patterns of diversification and 
specialization in the contemporary export-oriented, network-centered world-economy. While the 
diversification of the NICs' exports toward nontraditional, capital- and technology-intensive 
manufactured goods is now a clear trend (see Table 2) less well recognized is the tendency of the 
NICs to develop higher levels of specialization in their national export profiles. There is 
evidence of increasing heterogeneity in the export profiles of the NICs within East Asia and 
Latin America, for example, which leads us to question the assumption that there are 
homogeneous regional models of industrial development (see Gereffi 1989a). How and why did 
these patterns of export specialization emerge during the past several decades? How did the East 
Asian NICs construct such effective export networks for consumer goods in the 196Os? What 
are the lessons to be derived by other countries that wish to expand their manufactured exports 
today? 
 
Commodity chains are an important analytical tool that can be used to address some of these 
questions (see Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1990). Detailed studies of commodity chains in diverse 
industries are required in order to detect the mix of core-peripheral activities at each node of the 
chain, and also to identify the strategies different nations are pursuing to move upward or 
conversely to resist peripheralization in the world-system (Arrighi and Drangel 1986). The 
recent success of Korean automobiles, semiconductors, and home appliances, Taiwanese 
computers and sporting goods, and Mexican beer in the US market indicates that it is possible 
for firms in the NICs to capture significant shares of core-country markets, even in technology- 
and advertising-intensive industries. (See Newfarmer (1985) for a related approach applying 
industrial organization economics to a variety of internationally oriented manufacturing 
industries in Latin America.) Comparative research on commodity chains is needed to illuminate 
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the conditions under which domestic producers in the NICs can capture higher levels of 
economic surplus through integrated production and marketing strategies at the global level. 
 
National differences in government policies, economic organization, social structure, and culture 
are important determinants of how the NICs have responded to opportunities and constraints in 
the world-economy. Industrial policy in each of the NICs, for example, has been influenced by 
varied patterns of ownership in terms of the relative importance of foreign-owned corporations, 
state enterprises, and local private companies (Gereffi 1990a, 1990b). Intraregional differences 
are often as striking as cross-regional ones. Whereas South Korea's concentrated industrial 
structure composed of locally owned conglomerates and proletarian industrial communities 
predisposes it to a 'mass-production model' of economic growth, Taiwan's myriad array of 
smaller firms and its more fragmented labor force leads to a 'flexible-specialization model' of 
permanent innovation which attempts to accommodate change rather than control it (this theme 
is suggested but not developed in Sabel 1986, Deyo 1990). 
 
The social basis of competitiveness in the NICs focuses our attention on how economic activity 
is embedded in structures of social relations in modern industrial societies (Granovetter 1985). 
Effective production, export, and marketing networks are rooted in cooperative as well as 
competitive relationships that draw upon ethnicity, kinship, gender, class, and other social ties. 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, for example, have very different principles of social 
organization that affect their approach to domestic expansion as well as their orientation to world 
markets (see Hamilton et al. 1987, Hamilton and Biggart 1988). Research on the informal sector 
has highlighted how complex patterns of social embeddedness underlie efficient production 
arrangements that cut across social strata and realign the relations between employers, workers, 
and government in a wide range of nations (see Portes et al. 1989). These issues have become 
especially salient for many export-oriented industries in which global competitiveness requires 
rapid and flexible adaptations to changing conditions in the world-economy. 
 
Development theory needs to incorporate and integrate the global, national, and local levels of 
analysis if we are to understand the challenges and choices that confront industrializing nations. 
The false dilemma of outward- versus inward-oriented development must be replaced by a more 
comprehensive approach that sees countries as occupying differentiated roles in the world-
economy requiring a combination of export industries as well as those producing for domestic 
markets. A multidisciplinary view of development issues offers the best hope for theory that is 
responsive to concrete problems and also can provide the basis for useful generalizations. 
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